Round 8
Gold Coast v GWS
7:20pm, Sunday May 3 2026
Carrara Stadium
As I settled back in my lounge chair after the traditional Sunday roast at the mind-boggling time of 7:30pm on a Sunday work/school night on what appeared to be baffling fixture decision but was to accommodate the Queensland Labor Day Long Weekend I reflected on the two combatants. The crowd at Peoples First perhaps did not translate to the holiday time slot. Was there more that 10,000 in attendance?
I don’t enjoy the Expansion Cup. I don’t enjoy it at all. I was fifteen years CEO of AFL Queensland and in the later stages of my tenure played a key role in the formation of the Gold Coast Suns. I was a member of the GC17 committee, worked with the Bligh Government on the stadium development, signed the initial Queensland based youngsters including Charlie Dixon and did some behind the scenes work on the ‘poaching’ of Karmichael Hunt from Rugby League.
With that experience and background in a developing AFL market I landed in western Sydney in late 2011 to help build the fledgling club bottom up with now outgoing CEO Dave Matthews. Without fear or failure establishing an AFL club in foreign territory that is western Sydney was my toughest assignment in my near 30 years in the industry.
The creation of the Gold Coast Suns and Greater Western Sydney Giants was one of the AFL’s boldest strategic plays: not simply adding two clubs but planting long-term football infrastructure in two rugby-league-dominated growth markets. The Suns entered in 2011 as the 17th club; the Giants followed in 2012 as the 18th club. The AFL’s rationale was clear: national broadcast reach, junior participation growth, corporate expansion, demographic growth corridors, and a desire to stop being perceived as a southern-state code with only partial national penetration.
The AFL wanted a stronger footprint in South East Queensland and Western Sydney because these regions represented population growth, commercial opportunity, and long-term broadcast value. South East Queensland already had the Brisbane Lions, but the Gold Coast was a large, fast-growing city with a patchy history of professional sporting franchises. Western Sydney was even more ambitious: a vast, multicultural, rugby-league heartland with limited AFL tradition but enormous demographic scale.
The AFL’s logic was not short-term crowd return. It was a 30-year infrastructure play schools, academies, AFL Auskick, government partnerships, stadium development, community engagement and eventually elite local talent.
The Gold Coast bid was developed through the GC17 committee, a local steering and advocacy group formed to prove the region could support an AFL club. GC17 had to demonstrate community demand, government backing, corporate support and a viable football pathway. The AFL granted Gold Coast a provisional licence in March 2009, with entry scheduled for 2011.
GC17’s task was easier in one respect than GWS; the Gold Coast already had a visible Australian Football presence through the Southport FC and other Gold Coast clubs such as Palm Beach Currumbin, Coolangatta, Surfers Paradise and Labrador. The Gold Coast had a strong local junior base, the relocated Bears history, Brisbane Lions exposure and a stronger Queensland football pathway than NSW in Western Sydney. But it also carried risk: the Gold Coast had been a sporting graveyard for professional teams, including rugby league, basketball and association football franchises.
The Suns’ formation was therefore built around legitimacy. The club needed a star, a stadium, government support and a sense that it was not another transient Gold Coast experiment.
The Giants were developed through the Team GWS project, later branded as the Greater Western Sydney Giants. Unlike Gold Coast, this was not a bid emerging from an established AFL city. It was largely an AFL-led strategic intervention into hostile sporting territory.
The AFL had won support from the 16 club presidents in 2008 for an 18th team in Western Sydney. The project required significant league funding, draft concessions, stadium planning and community development before a ball was bounced. The club officially launched its Giants identity in 2010 and entered the AFL in 2012.
The Team GWS committee’s role was therefore less about proving an existing football market and more about building one almost from scratch. This was missionary work in rugby league country.
Gold Coast’s defining recruitment moment was the signing of Gary Ablett Jr from Geelong. Ablett was not merely a marquee player; he gave the Suns instant credibility, national media exposure and elite leadership. He signed a five-year deal and became the club’s inaugural captain.
The Suns also recruited Karmichael Hunt, a rugby league convert, to generate cross-code interest. On-field, Hunt was limited, but commercially and symbolically he helped put the Suns into Queensland’s sporting conversation.
GWS used a similar but broader approach. The Giants recruited experienced young AFL players such as Phil Davis, Callan Ward, Rhys Palmer and Tom Scully, with Davis and Ward becoming central leadership figures. The Giants also signed Israel Folau, another rugby league convert, in an attempt to attract attention in Western Sydney. Like Hunt, Folau was more valuable as a marketing signal than as a footballer.
The key difference was list construction. Gold Coast placed enormous cultural weight on Ablett. GWS built around a deeper group of elite draft talent and young leaders, which ultimately produced a stronger finals-era list.
The Suns’ early challenges included poor performances, player retention problems, injuries, coaching instability and the difficulty of building loyalty in a transient tourism city. Despite Ablett’s brilliance, the club struggled to create a hardened football culture.
GWS faced even harsher initial on-field results, including heavy defeats and consecutive wooden spoons, but its list strategy was more durable. The club absorbed pain early while accumulating elite talent. Its challenge was less football development and more market acceptance: small crowds, weak local tribalism, and competition from the NRL, football, cricket, basketball and the Sydney Swans.
Gold Coast’s membership strategy centred on local identity: ‘this is your city’s AFL club.’ It leaned into schools, families, junior participation, Carrara (currently People First Stadium), and the dream of giving the Gold Coast a serious national sporting team. That strategy has started to mature: the Suns passed 30,107 members in 2025, a club record.
GWS had to be more creative. It built a dual-market model: Western Sydney plus Canberra. The Canberra partnership gave the Giants immediate football credibility, stronger crowds than many Sydney fixtures, government support and an alternative supporter base. In 2025, GWS reached 37,705 members, also a club record.
However, crowds remain an issue for both clubs. GWS still battles low home attendances despite strong on-field performances; 2025 home figures show some crowds around the 8,000–12,000 range at Sydney Showground (Engie Stadium) and Manuka. Gerard Healy calls it a trainwreck.
On field, GWS has clearly been the more successful expansion club. The Giants reached finals for the first time in 2016, made a Grand Final in 2019, and have regularly been a finals contender. They have produced elite players, a strong football identity and a hard-edged competitive culture.
Gold Coast took much longer. For years, the Suns were the AFL’s problem child; talented, promising, but fragile. Their breakthrough finally came in 2025, when they reached their first AFL finals series and won their first final, defeating Fremantle by one point. That was a landmark moment, not just for the club but for the AFL’s long-term Queensland strategy.
Off field, both clubs remain works in progress but no longer look like failed experiments. Gold Coast posted an operating profit of $809,331 for 2025, alongside record membership and finals momentum. GWS has stronger on-field credibility and a larger membership base but still faces questions about whether it has fully embedded itself in Western Sydney.
The Suns feel more locally owned now than at any time in their history. The Giants feel more nationally respected than locally dominant.
The Gold Coast Suns were created to consolidate AFL’s Queensland presence and prove the Gold Coast could sustain a serious national club. The GWS Giants were created as a much more aggressive strategic invasion into Australia’s most important rugby league market.
To date, GWS has been the better football project: more finals, stronger talent production, a Grand Final appearance and a clearer competitive identity. Gold Coast has been the slower burn, but its 2025 finals breakthrough, record membership and improved financial position suggest the AFL’s patience may finally be paying off.
The AFL’s expansion gamble has not produced two powerhouse clubs yet. But it has produced two permanent northern beachheads. In strategic terms, that was always the real game.
And on Sunday night they met for the 20th time with the Giants dominating the head-to-head record winning 14 of the last 15 matches with overall win loss count 14-5 in favour of the Giants. It was billed as the Petracca versus Oliver clash the former Demons premiership heroes and best mates mixing it in the clinches for the first time. It was an enthralling contest. Oliver’s 20 possessions to half time was impressive. Petracca looked more dangerous.
In a frenetic, tough encounter in slippery conditions the Suns prevailed in an important victory for the club to retain in touch with the upper echelon of the ladder Gold Coast came out with intent, owning territory early through relentless pressure and slick ball movement, while the Giants absorbed the heat and counterpunched with precision through the corridor. The midfield battle was fierce, with contested possessions and clearances hotly fought, and both sides showing a willingness to take the game on. The Suns looked to have seized control midway through the third term, capitalising on turnovers and converting efficiently in front of goal, but GWS refused to yield, lifting their intensity and finding avenues to goal through quick transitions.
The final quarter was played at finals-like intensity, with the Giants surging late as their leaders stood tall in crucial moments, tightening the margin and setting up a tense finish. Gold Coast, however, held their nerve when it mattered most, with composed ball use and disciplined defending allowing them to repel repeated forward entries. Ugle-Hagan proved his worth with two important goals and Petracca ultimately took bragging rights over Oliver – but only just. For the Giants, the effort was undeniable but ultimately fell just short, while the Suns will take confidence from a hard-fought win built on resilience, pressure, and an ability to execute in the moments that mattered most.
GOLD COAST 3.4 4.8 8.13 11.117 (83)
GWS 1.7 3.10 5.13 8.15 (63)
GOALS
Gold Coast: Ugle-Hagan 3, Petracca, King 2, Jeffrey, Powell, Noble, Anderson
GWS: Cadman, Gothard 2, Stringer, Hogan, Bedford, Greene
BEST
Gold Coast: Petracca, Rioli, Miller, Powell, Noble, Uwland
GWS: Oliver, Callaghan, Whitfield, Ash
Crowd: 13,537
My votes:
3 – C. Petracca (GCS)
2 – T. Miller (GCS)
1 – C. Oliver (GWS)
Read more from Richard Griffiths HERE
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Thanks for your insights Richard.
What is your crystal ball revealing about the two expansion clubs in 5 and 10 years time?
I agree that they are two “permanent northern beachheads”. I sense that the AFL won’t go back on their drive into Rugby League territory.
There is a lot of groundwork uncompleted or neglected, especially in the case of Western Sydney. Getting bums on seats at Engie Stadium won’t happen until real junior football numbers start to climb dramatically. That is the glaring challenge that has been, in my opinion, mismanaged.